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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Keyword Advertising Explained
As we near the end of the first decade of the 21st Century and
two decades of Internet usage, consumers around the world are
355
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consistently using the Internet at a backbreaking pace to purchase
goods and services.' Consequently, businesses are looking for in-
novative ways to advertise to these online consumers. 2 Online
search engines such as Google and Yahoo! have provided a new
innovative way for businesses to advertise to these online consum-
ers called "keyword advertising."3 "Keyword advertising" allows
businesses to purchase a set of keywords from Internet search en-
gines.4 When an Internet consumer enters a search term into the
Internet search engine and the term matches a keyword pur-
chased by a business, the search engine will display sponsored
link advertisements for the business adjacent to the search engine
results.
5
B. Current Legal Dispute
While "keyword advertising" has provided an extremely valu-
able way for businesses to advertise products on the Internet, cer-
tain uses of keyword advertisements have erupted into legal ar-
guments. 6 To gain a competitive advantage, businesses will pur-
chase the trademark of another business as a keyword in order to
provide sponsored link advertisements any time the competitor's
trademark is typed into the search engine. 7 The competitor busi-
nesses are claiming that this use of their trademark in a keyword
1. Brian E. Banner, Anne M. Sterba, and Thomas D. Lyford, Special Focus Keyword
Advertising: the Competing Interests of Consumers and Trademark Owners, Rothwell, Figg,
Ernest & Manbeck PC,
http://www.worldtrademarkreport.com/yearbook/2007/Chapters/default.aspx?c=SFUS
(last visited Aug. 17, 2008). "[N]early 70% of US adults use the Internet as an information
source when shopping for goods and services." Id.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Adwords Help Center, Keyword Advertising,
http://adwords.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=10949 (last visited Aug.
17, 2008). "Google derives over 80% of its revenue from keyword advertising." CLE
PowerPoint Presentation, Bryce J. Maynard, Internet Keyword Advertising and Trademark
Law, Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney PC, June 30, 2008.
5. Adwords Help Center, Keyword Advertising,
http://adwords.google.com/supportlbin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=10949 (last visited Aug.
17, 2008). See Attachment 1 for an example of a sponsored link advertisement.
6. Banner, supra note 1.
7. Id. For example, Duquesne University School of Law may purchase the keywords
"Pitt Law" in order to have an advertisement placed on the search engine's result page
when a prospective law student searches for "Pitt Law" on the search engine. This keyword
purchase would allow Duquesne University School of Law to gain a competitive advantage
anytime a prospective law student researches "Pitt Law" because the prospective law stu-
dent would also see advertisements for Duquesne University School of Law on the search
engine's results page.
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advertisement is a violation of United States federal trademark
law-most specifically the Lanham Act.8
II. THE LANHAM ACT
Title 15, Section 1125(a) of the United States Code provides:
(a) Civil action
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods
or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce
any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any false des-
ignation of origin, false or misleading description of fact,
or false or misleading representation of fact, which--
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake,
or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or asso-
ciation of such person with another person, or as to
the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her
goods, services, or commercial activities by another
person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrep-
resents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geo-
graphic origin of his or her or another person's goods,
services, or commercial activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes
that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.9
When dealing with federal trademark infringement claims un-
der the Lanham Act that involve the Internet, courts may analyze
the claim under one of two separate doctrines: 1) likelihood of con-
fusion or 2) initial interest confusion. Federal courts typically
analyze the claim under the likelihood of confusion doctrine; how-
ever, an increasing minority of courts analyze the claim under the
initial interest confusion doctrine. 10
8. Id. This Comment will not address the other legal issue involving trademark key-
word advertising which is whether "the sale of another party's trademark as a search en-
gine keyword [is] a 'use in commerce?"' Maynard, supra note 4.
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006).
10. Banner, supra note 1. "Some courts have chosen to apply an offline precedent that
allows trademark infringement to be proven by consumer initial interest confusion." Id.
Spring 2009
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A. Likelihood of Confusion11
The cornerstone to any trademark infringement claim is likeli-
hood of confusion. 12 Likelihood of confusion requires that the pub-
lic believe that "the mark's owner sponsored or otherwise ap-
proved the use of the trademark."13 Courts evaluate likelihood of
confusion by weighing eight factors:
(1) "strength of the plaintiff's mark,"
(2) "relatedness of the goods or services,"
(3) "similarity of the marks,"
(4) "evidence of actual confusion,"
(5) "marketing channels used,"
(6) "likely degree of purchaser care,"
(7) "defendant's intent in selecting the mark," and
(8) "likelihood of expansion of product lines."'
14
The ultimate conclusion of a court when analyzing a likelihood
of confusion will depend on whether a consumer is likely to be con-
fused as to whether the products offered by the separate parties
are affiliated with one another. 15 The typical methods of proving a
likelihood of confusion are "1. [s]urvey evidence; 2. [e]vidence of
actual confusion; and/or 3. [a]rgument based on a clear inference
arising from a comparison of the conflicting marks and the context
of their use.'
16
11. The Sixth Circuit's analysis of likelihood of confusion is provided. All other circuit
courts of appeals analyze the same general elements of likelihood of confusion. Michelle L.
Evans, Establishing Liability for Trademark Infringement by the Use of Website Metatags,
84 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d. § 93 (2008).
12. Victoria's Secret Stores v. Artco Equip. Co., Inc., 194 F. Supp. 2d 704, 725 (S.D.
Ohio 2002).
13. Victoria's Secret Stores, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 725 (citing Carson v. Here's Johnny
Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 834 (6th Cir. 1983)).
14. Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, LP, 423 F.3d 539, 548 (6th Cir.
2005) (citing Frisch's Rests., Inc. v. Elby's Big Boy of Steubenville, Inc., 670 F.2d 642, 648
(6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982)).
15. Homeowners Group, Inc. v. Home Mktg. Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100, 1107 (6th
Cir. 1991).
16. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 23:2.50 (4th ed. 2008).
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B. Initial Interest Confusion
When dealing with federal trademark infringement claims on
the Internet, several courts have applied an alternative analysis
to the likelihood of confusion doctrine, called the initial interest
confusion doctrine. 17 Under this doctrine, first established by the
Ninth Circuit, completion of a confusion is not based on consumer
perception from initial interest through a sale.18 Instead, confu-
sion is evaluated when a search begins on the Internet and the
consumer becomes confused, creating an initial interest in a com-
petitor's product.' 9 The Ninth Circuit explained that this initial
interest confusion happens when "a[n] [Internet] user conducts a
search using a trademark term and the results of the search in-
clude websites not sponsored by the holder of the trademark
search term, but rather of the competitor."20
In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications
Corp.,2' Playboy Enterprises sought a preliminary injunction to
ban the Excite search engine from selling to other websites a list
of keywords, including "playboy" and "playmate."22 The owners of
these keywords were able to display advertisement banners on the
Excite website when the terms "playboy" and "playmate" were in-
put into a search on the Excite webpage. 23 The district court de-
nied the motion for a preliminary injunction and held that no like-
lihood of confusion existed.24 Playboy appealed, and the court of
17. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
18. Banner, supra note 1. The initial interest doctrine was established before Internet
trademark infringement cases by the Second Circuit in Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th.
Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331 (2d. Cir. 1975). Paul Anthony Marchi-
sotto, Gibson v. PRS: The Applicability of the Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine to Trade-
marked Product Shapes, 24 CARDoZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 883, 889 (2006); see also Banner,
supra note 1. In Grotrian, the court "held that even if consumers were aware of actual
source of a product at the time of purchase, infringement can still occur if the seller uses a
mark that attracts initial interest due to similarity." Banner, supra note 1. The Second
Circuit also applied this same analysis in a subsequent case Mobile Oil Corp. v. Pegasus
Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254 (2d. Cir. 1987). Banner, supra note 1; see also Marchisotto,
supra note 18, at 891.
19. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir.
2004).
20. Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1062-64 (9th
Cir. 1999). The Sixth Circuit has explained, "[ilnitial-interest confusion takes place when a
manufacturer improperly uses a trademark to create initial customer interest in a product,
even if the customer realizes, prior to purchase, that the product was not actually manufac-
tured by the trademark-holder." Marchisotto, supra note 18 at 889 (citing Gibson Guitar
Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, LP, 423 F.3d 539, 550 (6th Cir. 2005)).
21. 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004).
22. Playboy Enters., Inc., 354 F.3d at 1022-23.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1023.
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appeals affirmed and remanded the case. 25 On remand, the de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment was granted. 26 Again on
appeal, the court of appeals reversed and remanded the case.
27
The court held that the banners created an initial interest confu-
sion as to whether the advertisements were affiliated with Play-
boy Enterprises, and therefore, caused enough of a likelihood of
confusion to withstand the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment.28 In dicta, the court in Playboy did "[n]ote that if a banner
advertisement clearly identified its source ... no confusion would
occur under" the initial interest confusion doctrine.
29
III. SPLIT IN THE CIRCUITS
The circuits are split on how to analyze trademark "keyword
advertising" because the "keyword does not create a 'likelihood of
confusion' in the traditional sense."30 As a result of the way "key-
word advertising" works, even though a business's trademark is
included in the advertisement, the consumer sees the link for the
competitor's business and therefore, there is no traditional "likeli-
hood of confusion" as to which business the link and products
within the link belong.31 The minority of the circuits use the ini-
tial interest confusion doctrine as a way to find trademark in-
fringement because the "[p]arty purchasing the advertisement has
relied on the fame of the trademark keyword to a get a 'foot in the
door' with consumers."32 The following section will show how vari-
ous circuits have analyzed this issue.
A. Third Circuit
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania has declined to extend the
initial interest confusion doctrine to include "keyword advertis-
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Playboy Enters., Inc., 354 F.3d at 1034.
28. Id. at 1025-26. The court proceeded to analyze the claim under the eight likelihood
of confusion factors. Id. at 1026. The court concluded that there was a likelihood of confu-
sion. Id. at 1029.
29. Id. at 1025 n. 16.
30. Maynard, supra note 4.
31. Maynard, supra note 4.
32. Maynard, supra note 4. The consumers are first confused when they see the adver-
tisement because they see the trademark they are searching for; however, they are no
longer confused when they see the actual link for the webpage. Maynard, supra note 4.
360 Vol. 47
Trademark Keyword Advertising
ing.'' 33 In JG Wentworth v. Settlement Funding LLC,34 JG Wen-
tworth alleged that Settlement Funding LLC violated JG Wen-
tworth's trademark when Settlement Funding LLC bought the
keyword "JG Wentworth" from Google to obtain sponsored link
advertisements to the Settlement Funding LLC website anytime
"JG Wentworth" was typed into the Google search engine. 35 JG
Wentworth alleged that this ploy was trademark infringement
because Settlement Funding LLC used the "JG Wentworth"
trademark to "bait and switch" consumers to visit the Settlement
Funding LLC website.36 The district court disagreed and found
that there was no likelihood of confusion and no trademark in-
fringement because the Settlement Funding LLC website link was
"separate and distinct" from JG Wentworth's website link and
therefore, no potential consumers could have the "opportunity to
confuse defendant's services, goods, advertisements, links or web-
sites for those of' JG Wentworth's.
37
From the analysis in JG Wentworth, it appears that at least one
district court within the Third Circuit will not provide an initial
interest confusion analysis to trademark "keyword advertising" on
the Internet as long as Internet consumers are able to distinguish
from an advertisement that the sponsored link website is not af-
filiated with the trademark used in that advertisement.
B. Fourth Circuit
The Eastern District of Virginia seemed to apply the same
analysis as the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, but it decided
that trademark infringement could exist if a sponsored link con-
tained another business's trademark. 38 In GEICO v. Google,
39
Google sold the keyword "GEICO" to allow for sponsored link ad-
vertisements to a rival insurance company's websites any time
"GEICO" was typed into the Google search engine. 40 After GEICO
filed the action for a preliminary and permanent injunction
against Google from selling the "GEICO" trademark as a keyword,
33. JG Wentworth v. Settlement Funding LLC, No. 06-0597, 2007 WL 30115, at *7
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2007).
34. No. 06-0597, 2007 WL 30115 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2007).
35. JG Wentworth, 2007 WL 30115, at *2.
36. Id. at *7.
37. Id. at *8.
38. Jonathan Pink, Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine, Magazine of Intellectual Prop-
erty & Technology (July 06, 2005), http://www.ipfrontline.com/printtemplate.asp?id=4697.
39. No. 1:04CV507, 2005 WL 1903128 (E.D. Va. Aug. 8, 2005).
40. GEICO, 2005 WL 1903128, at *2.
Spring 2009
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Google filed a motion to dismiss the Lanham Act claims. 41 The
district court denied the motion.42  In analyzing the trademark
infringement claim, the court only applied a likelihood of confu-
sion analysis-not an initial interest confusion analysis.
43
In contrast, however, to the JG Wentworth case in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, the Eastern District of Virginia court
stated in dicta that, if Google had allowed the "GEICO" trademark
to be used in the text or heading of the sponsored link advertise-
ment, a violation of the Lanham Act might exist.44 Based on this
analysis, it appears that the Fourth Circuit may find a violation of
the Lanham Act if the sponsored link advertisement uses the
trademark keyword anywhere within the advertisement. This
analysis would be based on the standard likelihood of confusion
analysis and the Fourth Circuit may only attribute a small portion
of its analysis to the minority initial interest confusion analysis.
C. Sixth Circuit
When dealing with Internet trademark infringement, the Sixth
Circuit has not settled the status of the initial interest confusion
doctrine. 45 When the court of appeals in Gibson Guitar Corp. v.
Paul Reed Smith Guitars, LP46 was asked to apply the initial in-
terest confusion doctrine to a trademark dispute over the shape of
a guitar, it refused to do so.47 The court of appeals distinguished
the case from Paccar Inc. v. Telescan Technologies, LLC,48 in
which the court of appeals implied that it could apply the initial
41. Id. at*1.
42. GEICO v. Google, 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 704 (E.D. Va. 2004). The court based its
decision on the premise that GEICO's marks were used in commerce by Google and there-
fore a motion to dismiss would be improper. Id.
43. Pink, supra note 38. The court did state that "GEICO failed to prove that Google's
Adwords programme caused initial interest confusion among consumers." Banner, supra
note 1. The court, therefore, did leave the door open so that the court may apply an initial
interest confusion analysis in the future.
44. GEICO, 2005 WL 1903128, at *7.
45. Currently there is only one reported case from the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
that applies the initial interest confusion doctrine to an Internet context. Marchisotto,
supra note 18, at 900. Paccar Inc. v. Telescan Technologies, LLC, 319 F.3d 243, 249 (6th
Cir. 2003) (overruled on other grounds) did not apply the initial interest doctrine to trade-
mark keyword advertisements, but the case will be analyzed to show how the Sixth Circuit
may rule on the issue. At least one court within the Sixth Circuit has determined that a
motion to dismiss is inappropriate in a trademark infringement case involving keyword
advertisements. T.D.I. Int'l, Inc. v. Golf Preservations, Inc., No. 6:07-313-DCR, 2008 WL
294531 (S.D. Ky. Jan. 31, 2008).
46. 423 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 2005).
47. Gibson Guitar Corp., 423 F.3d at 551.
48. 319 F.3d 243 (6th Cir. 2003).
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interest confusion doctrine to an Internet trademark infringement
case. 49 The court reiterated that in Paccar its decision was based
on the relatedness of the goods or services, similarity of the marks,
and simultaneous use of the Internet as a marketing channel-not
the initial interest confusion doctrine.50 Notably, the court's deci-
sion still rested on the standard likelihood of confusion doctrine.
51
While the Sixth Circuit will analyze all eight elements of the
likelihood of confusion doctrine, the court has no set mathematical
formula as to which, or how many, of the elements the plaintiff
needs to prove to be successful in its claim.52 In cases involving
the Internet, the Sixth Circuit will place more emphasis on the
relatedness of the goods or services, similarity of the marks, and
simultaneous use of the Internet as a marketing channel.
53
In Paccar, Paccar Inc., a trucking company, asserted a trade-
mark infringement claim and trademark dilution claim under the
Lanham Act against the owners of a used truck locator website.
54
Paccar Inc. alleged that the website owners used Paccar Inc.'s
trademarks in its Internet domain names and meta tags. 55 The
district court granted a preliminary injunction against the website
owners as to the domain name, and the website owners ap-
pealed.
56
The court of appeals affirmed the preliminary injunction.57 The
court held that Paccar Inc. had "demonstrated a likelihood of con-
fusion and, thus, a strong likelihood of success on the merits of its
trademark infringement claim."58 The holding of the court relied
heavily on the relatedness of the goods or services, similarity of
the marks, and simultaneous use of the Internet as a marketing
channel and factored little on the other five elements of likelihood
of confusion.
59
49. Paccar Inc., 319 F.3d at 253.
50. Gibson Guitar Corp., 423 F.3d at 550-51.
51. Id.
52. Paccar Inc., 319 F.3d at 249.
53. Id. at 254.
54. Id. at 248-49.
55. Id. '"Meta tags are hidden html tags of an html document that are not displayed in
a browser but provide a browser or search engine robot with useful information." What Are
HTML Meta Tags? (Meta Tag Tutorial),
http://www.theemiratesnetwork.com/computers/webmaster/metatagl.htm (last visited Aug.
17, 2008).
56. Paccar Inc., 319 F.3d at 248-49.
57. Id. at 258.




Based on the ruling in the Paccar case, it appears that, even if
the Sixth Circuit would apply the initial interest confusion doc-
trine to a sponsored link advertisement using a competing trade-
mark as a keyword, it is likely that the Sixth Circuit will still base
its decision on the likelihood of confusion doctrine, focusing on the
relatedness of the goods or services, similarity of the marks, and
simultaneous use of the Internet as a marketing channel. From
this analysis, one could determine that the Sixth Circuit does not
believe that the initial interest confusion doctrine is its own doc-
trine separate from the likelihood of confusion doctrine.
D. Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit continues to apply an initial interest confu-
sion analysis when dealing with trademark "keyword advertising"
on the Internet. In Storus Corp. v. Aroa Marketing, Inc.,60 the
Northern District of California applied an initial interest confu-
sion analysis to hold that Aroa Marketing, Inc. ("Aroa") violated
the trademark of Storus Corp. ("Storus") when Aroa bought the
keyword "Smart Money Clip"-a product produced by Storus-
from Google to allow for sponsored link advertisements to one of
Aroa's websites any time "Smart Money Clip" was typed into the
Google search engine.6
1
The Northern District of California, like the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals, analyzed the claim under the Internet trilogy of the
likelihood of confusion doctrine- relatedness of the goods or ser-
vices, similarity of the marks, and simultaneous use of the Inter-
net as a marketing channel. 62 The court then concluded that these
factors weighed in the favor of Storus because, under the initial
interest confusion doctrine, "'source confusion' need not occur;
rather, in the Internet context, the wrongful act is the defendant's
[Aroa's] use of the plaintiffs [Storus's] mark to 'divert' consumers
to a website 'consumers know' is not Storus' website." 63
Interestingly, it appears that the court in Storus Corp. may
have deviated from the original initial interest confusion analysis
supplied in Playboy.64 The Ninth Circuit unambiguously stated in
60. No. C-06-2454 MMC, 2008 WL 449835 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2008).
61. Storus Corp., 2008 WL 449835, at *4.
62. Id. at *3.
63. Id. at *4. The court also focused its analysis on the fact that "[t]he 'Smart Money
Clip' portion of the ad [was] underlined and set forth in a larger font than that used in the
rest of the text in the [sponsored link] ad." Id. See also Maynard, supra note 4.
64. See supra notes 18-29 and accompanying text.
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Playboy's dicta that, if the Internet advertisement clearly showed
the source of the advertisement, no confusion would occur under
an initial interest confusion analysis. 65 The court in Storus Corp.
noticeably ignored this dicta and ruled in favor of trademark in-
fringement under an initial interest confusion analysis even
though Aroa's advertisement clearly displayed the source of the
advertisement. 66 It is unclear whether the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals will agree with this analysis or whether other courts in
the Ninth Circuit will follow this deviation from the original initial
interest confusion doctrine supplied by the Northern District of
California.
What remains clear is that-based on the decision in Storus
Corp.-the Ninth Circuit is committed to continuing the applica-
tion of a form of the initial interest confusion doctrine to trade-
mark "keyword advertising" on the Internet. The Ninth Circuit
will probably analyze the trademark infringement claim under the
Internet trilogy of the likelihood of confusion doctrine. However, if
the Ninth Circuit finds any initial interest confusion, it will rule in
favor of trademark infringement whether or not post-sale confu-
sion occurred.
E. Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits
The Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have not ruled specifi-
cally on trademark "keyword advertising" on the Internet; how-
ever, from their rulings in other trademark infringement cases, it
appears that the Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits may be open
to applying some sort of initial interest confusion analysis along
with a likelihood of confusion analysis.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Elvis Presley Enterprises
Inc. v. Capece67 applied an initial interest confusion analysis
within the actual confusion element of the likelihood of confusion
analysis to allow for trademark infringement against Capece for
using the mark, "The Velvet Elvis," as a name of Capece's night
club. 68 The court reasoned that an initial interest confusion analy-
sis was applied because customers were lured into "The Velvet
Elvis" night club thinking it was associated with the trademarked
"Elvis Presley" name.69 The court then reasoned that it did not
65. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
66. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
67. 141 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1998).
68. Marchisotto, supra note 18, at 892. See Elvis Presley, 141 F.3d at 204.
69. Marchisotto, supra note 18, at 892.
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matter under an initial interest confusion analysis if the custom-
ers realized the night club was not associated with "Elvis Presley"
once they entered the night club. 70 Once the customers were lured
into the club, the initial interest confusion was complete.
71
Based on the Fifth Circuit's analysis in Elvis Presley, it appears
that the Fifth Circuit may apply an initial interest confusion
analysis within the actual confusion element of the likelihood of
confusion analysis when ruling on trademark "keyword advertis-
ing" on the Internet. If the court would find that a sponsored link
advertisement lured an online customer into a website based on
the use of a trademarked name, that court might be inclined to
rule that there was initial interest confusion and trademark in-
fringement even if the customer knew the true source of the web-
site and its products before making a purchase.
The Seventh Circuit has also adopted the initial interest confu-
sion doctrine in at least some trademark infringement cases. In
Promatek Industries v. Equitrac Corp.,72 the court stated that
"[ilnitial interest confusion, which is actionable under the Lanham
Act, occurs when a customer is lured to a product by the similarity
of the mark, even if the customer realizes the true source of the
goods before the sale is consummated." 73 The court used the ini-
tial interest confusion doctrine to uphold the district court's grant-
ing of a preliminary injunction against Equitrac Corp., enjoining it
from using Promatek Industries' trademark in the meta tags for
the Equitrac Corp. website.
74
The Tenth Circuit, also in a trademark infringement case in-
volving the use of a competitor's trademark within the meta tags
of the defendant's website, adopted the initial interest confusion
doctrine. 75 The court, in Australian Gold Inc. v. Hatfield,76 stated
it would:
recognize another variant of potential confusion: "initial in-
terest confusion." Initial interest confusion results when a
consumer seeks a particular trademark holder's product and
instead is lured to the product of a competitor by the competi-
tor's use of the same or similar mark. Even though the con-
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 300 F.3d 808 (7th Cir 2002).
73. Promatek Indus., 300 F.3d at 812.
74. Id. at 814.
75. Australian Gold Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2006).
76. 436 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2006).
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sumer may eventually realize that the product is not the one
originally sought, he or she may stay with the competitor. In
that way, the competitor has captured the trademark holder's
potential visitors or customers.
77
While the Seventh and Tenth Circuits have not ruled on trade-
mark "keyword advertising" on the Internet, based on the previ-
ously mentioned decisions, it appears clear they would apply an
initial interest confusion analysis to that claim. What is not clear
is whether the court would allow for initial interest confusion even
if the true source of the advertisement was displayed within the
sponsored link advertisement.
F. First and Eighth Circuits
While the Courts of Appeals for the First and Eighth Circuits
have not addressed trademark "keyword advertising" on the
Internet, it is most likely that neither circuit would apply an ini-
tial interest confusion analysis and that both would apply the
standard likelihood of confusion analysis to the claim.
The First Circuit specifically denounced the initial interest con-
fusion doctrine in Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc.78 In Has-
bro-a trademark infringement case dealing with the use of a
competitor's trademark within the name of the defendant's web-
site address-the court announced that the First Circuit has
clearly stated in the past that it would not adopt the initial inter-
est confusion doctrine because it would not lead to legally signifi-
cant confusion.
7 9
The court for the District of Minnesota, within the Eighth Cir-
cuit, explained that although the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
had not yet addressed the initial interest confusion doctrine, the
district court believed that the Eighth Circuit would not adopt the
initial interest confusion doctrine.80 Just as the Hasbro case,
Northland Insurance Co. v. Blaylock l was a trademark infringe-
ment case dealing with the use of a competitor's trademark within
the name of the defendant's website address. 8 2 While not applying
an initial interest confusion analysis, the court did state that an
77. Australian Gold Inc., 436 F.3d at 1238-39 (internal citations omitted).
78. 232 F.3d 1 (ist Cir. 2000).
79. Hasbro, Inc., 232 F.3d at 2.
80. Northland Ins. Co. v. Blaylock, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1120 (D. Minn. 2000).
81. 115 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (D. Minn. 2000).
82. Northland Ins. Co., 115 F. Supp. 2d at 1114.
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initial interest confusion analysis possibly could be applied if a
"defendant stood to materially or financially gain from said initial
confusion by trading in on the value of plaintiffs mark to initially
attract customers. ' 3
Although it is still debatable, it is likely that the Eighth Circuit
would not apply an initial interest confusion analysis to trade-
mark "keyword advertising" on the Internet. The Eighth Circuit
would probably reason that, because trademark "keyword adver-
tising" allows customers to see the true owner of the website rep-
resenting the sponsored link advertisement, an initial interest
confusion analysis would not be applied.
G. Second and Eleventh Circuits
The Second and Eleventh Circuits have also not ruled specifi-
cally on trademark "keyword advertising" on the Internet. Both
circuits, however, have ruled on the use of a competitor's trade-
mark in the meta tags on the defendant's website.8 4 While both
circuits have ruled on trademark infringement on the Internet, it
is still unclear whether these courts would apply a standard like-
lihood of confusion analysis or an initial interest confusion analy-
sis.
District courts within the Second Circuit have dealt with the
use of a competitor's trademark in the meta tags in the defen-
dant's website on at least four separate occasions.85 Within these
cases, three district courts applied an initial interest confusion
analysis and one refused to apply an initial interest confusion
analysis.86 While it is unsettled whether the Second Circuit would
83. Id. at 1120.
84. See infra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
85. Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 319 (S.D. N.Y. 2000).
86. Bihari, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 319. The courts that applied the initial interest confu-
sion doctrine were: Bihari, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, NY State Soc'y of Certified Pub. Account-
ants v. Eric Louis Assoc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), and OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight
Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176 (W.D.N.Y. 2000). Bihari, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 319. The
court that refused to apply the initial interest doctrine was BigStar Entm't, Inc. v. Next Big
Star, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 185 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Bihari, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 319.
87. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. A more clear answer may be forthcom-
ing. Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Rescuecom v. Google, No. 06-
4881-cv, 2009 WL 875447 (2d Cir. Apr. 3, 2009), vacated and remanded a district court
decision that granted Google's motion to dismiss in a trademark "keyword advertising" suit.
Rescuecom, 2009 WL 875447 at *7. In vacating the district court's opinion, the court of
appeals held that Google's selling to advertisers the Rescuecom trademark and displaying
the Rescuecom trademark to advertisement consumers was a "use in commerce" under the
Lanham Act. Id. at *5-7. As a result of this decision, the district court will have to decide
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apply an initial interest confusion analysis to a case involving
trademark "keyword advertising" on the Internet, it is likely that
the Second Circuit would, as the initial interest confusion doctrine
was first developed in the Second Circuit in 1975.87
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in North Ameri-
can Medial Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc.88 declined to rule on
whether to adopt the initial interest confusion doctrine when deal-
ing with the use of a competitor's trademark in the meta tags in
the defendant's website.8 9 The Eleventh Circuit did state in dicta
that the initial interest confusion doctrine could possibly be ap-
plied in "situation[s] where the trademarks are used without being
displayed to consumers."90
Whether the Eleventh Circuit would apply the initial interest
confusion doctrine in a case involving trademark "keyword adver-
tising" on the Internet remains to be seen. However, given the
fact that in sponsored link advertisements the trademark is dis-
played to the customer, the Eleventh Circuit would probably rule
on the issue using a standard likelihood of confusion analysis.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine Should Not Be Applied
in Cases Involving Trademark Keyword Advertising
The Ninth Circuit and other circuits that have followed suit in
applying an initial interest confusion doctrine analysis to cases
involving trademark "keyword advertising" are simply wrong.
The Lanham Act specifically lists the elements of trademark in-
fringement, and any judicial remedy carved out by the Ninth Cir-
cuit to allow for trademark infringement on the Internet is against
the intent of the Lanham Act. Furthermore, the application of the
initial interest confusion doctrine would disallow keyword spon-
whether to apply a standard likelihood of confusion analysis or an initial interest confusion
analysis to Rescuecom's Lanham Act claims.
88. 522 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 2008).
89. N. Am. Medial Corp., 522 F.3d at 1222. The court ruled "because NAM and Adagen
have demonstrated a likelihood of actual source confusion, we need not decide, as those
courts did [referencing other circuit courts of appeals], whether initial interest confusion




sored-link-advertisements and thus would frustrate the intent and
interest of online consumers.
1. The Lanham Act Specifically Lists the Elements of Trade-
mark Infringement
The Lanham Act specifically states that trademark infringe-
ment will only be actionable when a person has caused confusion
"as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with
another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his
or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another...,"91 As
noted by the Public Citizens Litigation Group in an amicus brief
filed in the Second Circuit, a plain reading of the Lanham Act only
forbids deceptive uses of a trademark that would cause confusion
to consumers regarding the source of a product.
92
The initial interest confusion doctrine not only allows for confu-
sion at the point of sale of a product, but also extends to initial
confusion when consumers begin their search on the Internet and
become initially confused and interested in a competitor's prod-
uct.93 Once a judge allows for this analysis, the judge is engaging
in judicial activism.94 Nowhere within the Lanham Act does it
state that trademark infringement is actionable prior to the point
of sale of a product. When a business uses sponsored link adver-
tisements using the trademark of a competitor within the adver-
tisement, a small amount of initial confusion may exist; however,
no confusion exists at the point of sale when the consumer follows
the advertisement link and determines that the advertisement
leads to an entirely different business's website.
If the legislature wanted trademark infringement to be action-
able based on initial interest confusion, the legislature would have
written it into the statute. Until and unless the legislature does
so, judges are simply wrong to create their own judicial remedy
called the initial interest confusion doctrine. The likelihood of
confusion doctrine analyzes a trademark infringement claim as
91. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
92. Brief for Public Citizens as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmation at 9-10, Rescue-
corn Corp. v. Google, Inc., (2d. Cir. 2007) (No. 06-4881-cv). An amicus brief is filed by "[a]
person who is not a party to a lawsuit but who petitions the court or is requested by the
court to file a brief in the action because that person has a strong interest in the subject
matter." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 71 (8th ed. 2004).
93. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
94. 'The initial interest doctrine has allowed some courts to do away with this tradi-
tional analysis (likelihood of confusion), creating a short-cut to infringement, like a judicial
game of shoots and ladders." Pink, supra note 38.
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stated in the Lanham Act and is the only analysis that should be
applied to a trademark infringement claim.
2. Allowing Initial Interest Confusion Would Frustrate Con-
sumers' Interests
The initial interest confusion doctrine does not take into account
the intent and interest of consumers on the Internet. An Internet
search engine is a powerful tool that allows consumers to sift
through hundreds of thousands of Internet websites to find a cer-
tain product they are looking for.9 5 A consumer may be conduct-
ing a general search online using a particular trademarked word
or term, but may not be only searching for that trademarked word
or term.
96
For example, consider the example sponsored link advertise-
ment provided in footnote seven.97 A prospective law student may
enter the search term "Pitt Law" into an Internet search engine to
gain information about the University of Pittsburgh School of
Law. The student may not only be interested in the University of
Pittsburgh School of Law, but also may be interested in other law
schools in the same geographic area. The Duquesne University
School of Law-sponsored link advertisement-which features the
trademarked term "Pitt Law"-would then be very useful for the
prospective law student. The prospective law student would be
able to click on the link and gain information about another law
school in the Pittsburgh area. If the prospective law student is not
interested in the Duquesne University School of Law, that pro-
spective law student may simply click out of the website.
When the prospective law student sees the "Pitt Law" sponsored
link advertisement, the prospective law student may at first be
initially confused and may believe that the link is to the Univer-
sity of Pittsburgh School of Law. This initial confusion, however,
is defeated when the prospective law student looks at the website
address within the sponsored link advertisement or clicks on the
link and sees that the source is another Pittsburgh-area law
school.
95. Brief for Public Citizens as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmation at 11-12, Res-
cuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., (2d. Cir. 2007) (No. 06-4881-cv).
96. Brief for Public Citizens as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmation at 13-14, Res-
cuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., (2d. Cir. 2007) (No. 06-4881-cv) (providing examples of why
Internet consumers may be searching a certain trademarked term or word).
97. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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To apply an initial interest confusion analysis to this scenario
and find trademark infringement would be unequivocally wrong.
When a consumer conducts a search on the Internet, a business or
individual has every right to advertise to that consumer so long as
the individual or business does not deceive the consumer into
thinking the trademarked business or individual is the source of
the advertisement. In the above example, there is no deception
into the source of the advertisement. Duquesne University School
of Law is simply advertising that if you are interested in "Pitt
Law," you also should research Duquesne University School of
Law.
If an initial interest confusion analysis is applied to this sce-
nario, it would have grave consequences for all types of advertise-
ments. For example, businesses would be greatly dissuaded from
stating the names of their competitors on television, radio, or
other media sources to entice consumers to try their products in-
stead of their competitors. 98 The United States is the benchmark
country for free trade and the free flow of ideas; to take away the
right to advertise in certain ways would be reprehensible to the
value system in the United States. Businesses and individuals
should be able to advertise any way that they see fit as long as
they are not using the trademark of another entity to deceive the
public. Furthermore, the United States public and consumers
have every right to search a trademark and gain information
about that trademark and competitors of that trademark. Apply-
ing the initial interest confusion doctrine to trademark "keyword
advertising" would take away these rights as any type of initial
confusion would cause a sponsored link advertisement to be a
trademark infringement.
B. The Likelihood of Confusion Doctrine Should Be Applied in
Cases Involving Trademark Keyword Advertising
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania has provided the best
analysis of trademark infringement involving trademark "keyword
advertising."99 The likelihood of confusion doctrine follows the
98. See Maynard, supra note 4 (providing analogies to non-internet advertisements).
Albeit, the businesses may be able to utilize a "fair use" defense to any infringement claim.
"Fair use is a defense to an infringement claim, depending on the following statutory fac-
tors: (1) the purpose and character of the use, (2) the nature of the copyrighted work, (3)
the amount of the work used, and (4) the economic impact of the use. 17 USCA § 107."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 507 (8th ed. 2004).
99. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
Vol. 47372
Trademark Keyword Advertising
legislative intent of the Lanham Act and provides the correct out-
come in sponsored link advertisement cases. Applying a standard
likelihood of confusion analysis proves that no trademark in-
fringement occurs when trademarks are used in keyword adver-
tisements. Sponsored link advertisements that clearly display the
website address of the advertising business or individual do not
deceive individual consumers because the source of the advertise-
ment is displayed and, therefore, under a likelihood of confusion
analysis, there would be no trademark infringement.
Additionally, even if courts apply the Ninth Circuit's Internet
initial interest confusion doctrine, the same conclusion should be
reached. Recall that in dicta the Ninth Circuit in Playboy did
"[n]ote that if a banner advertisement clearly identified its
source.. .no confusion would occur under" an initial interest confu-
sion theory.10 0 If the sponsored link advertisement displayed its
source, then there is no confusion. Because at least one court,
however, has not followed the dicta in Playboy'0' and allowed for
trademark infringement even when the source of the advertise-
ment was displayed, only the likelihood of confusion doctrine
should be applied.
V. CONCLUSION
As the Internet continues to be increasingly utilized by consum-
ers to buy and research products and services, the use of "keyword
advertising" provided in sponsored link advertisements on Inter-
net search engines will increase greatly. This new type of Internet
advertising using others' trademarks will intensify significant le-
gal debate on whether there has been trademark infringement.
While various circuit courts of appeals in the United States at-
tempt to determine how to analyze this issue, they must remain
cognizant that the Lanham Act only allows for a likelihood of con-
fusion analysis and not an initial interest confusion analysis. Any
application of an initial interest confusion analysis to trademark
"keyword advertising" on the Internet would fly in the face of the
intent of the Lanham Act and would erode the current trademark
legal framework in the United States.
Patrick Ryan Barry
100. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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